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Introduction
Almost all common carrier transportation in the United States is
subject to profit control by regulatory commissions. The actual effect
of such profit control varies among transportation modes. For the
railroads, profits are set by competition, and the public statements of
ICC officials indicate that if they could think of an easy way to raise
rail profits they would. Motor carriers' rates, and hence profits, are set
largely by the level of rail rates. Airline earnings have on occasion, such
as the General Passenger Fare Investigation of 1956, been determined
by regulatory action. For pipelines, regulatory profit control is of more
importance. Finally, regulation is the dominant determinant of earn-
ings in the regulated industries outside transportation, such as the
telephone and electric power industries.
Even though regulatory action plays a varying role in determining
earnings of the so-called public utility industries, it is obviously of
considerable practical importance. The purpose of this paper is to
examine various measures of profits which might guide a public agency
in determining the existence of inadequate or excess profits in a
regulated industry. Although profit standards for regulated industries
were a perennial topic for economists prior to the war, the subject has
been generally ignored since then.
The indifference of economists to regulatory standards may be
influenced in part by an increasingly widespread view that the proper
policy is the deregulation of the so-called regulated industries. We
think there is much merit in such a view; indeed, we have argued else-
where the economic case for a substantial degree of deregulation of200 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
the transportation industries. Nonetheless, we do not think the public
utility concept completely outmoded; there are sectors of the economy
where competition does not suffice to protect the public interest.1
Furthermore, the process of removing regulation is at best a slow one;
in the interim, how the regulated sector of the economy is managed is
an important question.
Another source of economists' indifference may be the belief that the
control of pricing rather than the control of profits should be the focus
of regulation.Profit control, after all, not oñiy has a very negative,
perhaps anticapitalistic connotation, but also is a subject about which
economic theory has had relatively little to say.By contrast, that
theory has a great deal to say about a socially efficient set of prices as a
mechanism to allocate resources, at least in the short run. But detailed
regulatory control of prices in practice tends to be unworkable,
especially in achieving efficiency objectives.The record of the ICC
suggests that managerial freedom to set prices would produce a closer
approximation to the economists' efficiency norm, at least under
present circumstances, than regulation •2
Economistsalso may believe that economic analysis has nothing
new to contribute to the topic of a "fair" return. We believe, on the
contrary, that economic analysis has at least two important points to
make.First, concepts in capital theory clearly demonstrate that
measures of profits traditionally used in regulation (such as rate-of-
return on original or reproduction cost of equipment) contain inherent
biases which will understate or overstate true returns, basically because
these usual measures do not take explicit account of the timing in the
pattern of profits and the economic longevity of equipment. Second,
economic analysis can provide a framework for recognizing the impact
of both the changing value of the dollar and improvements in the
productivity of capital equipment. Inflation deserves an explicit treat-
ment in regulatory decisions in order to protect the adequacy of service
by insuring funds for new and replacement equipment, and to recognize
'The technology and cost structure of many transportation activities do not
preclude competition nor fit the economists' concept of natural monopoly. This is
in sharp contrast to the electric power, gas, and water industries, where duplicating
service is clearly wasteful. I.ndeed, a reasonably high level of competition already pre-
vails in the transportation industry and, if not inhibited by government regulations,
even more competition would almost unquestionably come into being very quickly.
2Thisleaves untouched a third aspect of regulation, control of costs. Our analysis
omits this problem. For a recent and stimulating discussion on certain aspects of
this problem, see Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm
under Regulatory Constraint," American Economic Review, LII, 2, Dec. 1962, pp.
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the equitable interest of investors in their real income. At the same
time, explicit thought should be given to the distribution of the gains
of new technology between consumer and investor. The regulatory
literature now gives little recognition to the problem.
We take as our starting point for this exploratory investigation the
proposition that regulation is a substitute for competition in protecting
the public interest. This proposition underlies most of the judicial and
legal action as well as most writing on regulation. While competition
may not always produce optimum results, and regulation may aim at
other goals than simulating competition, the record of regulatory
efforts and of competition in numerous sectors of the U.S. economy
suggests that competition produces a rough optimum, and the results
of competition are, in the long run, the most workable standard for
the administration of the regulated sectors of a free enterprise economy.
A regulated firm operating in a competitive environment must buy its
supplies at prices set by competition; it compensates its employees at
wage levels commensurate with those in nonregulated industries, and,
however protected its position within the industry, it competes for
consumer's dollars against the nonregulated competitive industries.
Most importantly, a regulated firm buys its capital at prices set in
economy-wide capital markets. Any return to investors persistently
below those established in the capital markets for the nonregulated
firms will eventually create difficulties in attracting capital to the
regulated firms and industries.The process of regulation in a free
enterprise economy, therefore, must include recognition of the fact
that a regulated firm and industry will follow the trends of prices, wages,
and profits in the rest of the economy.
We would stress that our analysis is illustrative and tentative. The
concepts used require further development and clarification prior to
actual application. Moreover, our concentration upon the measurement
of profits does not reflect a belief that any such measurement can
substitute in the regulatory process for an examination of the risks and
profit needs of an industry in terms of investment requirements and
financial acceptability, or for an examination of the equitable claims
of consumers against excess profits and the investors for an adequate
income. Clearly it is the final impact of regulation in meeting these
claims and requirements which is paramount rather than the results in
terms of any one measure of profit.3
The Supreme Court has stated "It is not the theory but the impact of the rate
order which counts." See Federal Power Commission vs. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591 at 601—602. See also Atchison, Fair Reward and Just Compensation,
1954, Chapter II.202 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
Measures of the Rate of Return
RATE OF RETURN ON A RATE BASE
The most widely used approach to a regulatory determination of
reasonable profits has been through the measurement of profits as a
percentage of a rate base. Two distinct definitions of the rate base
are in wide use: reproduction cost—defined as the current cost of
reproducing the capital equipment; and original cost—defined as the
historical cost of the equipment plus working capital and minus
accrued depreciation (roughly equivalent to average historical net
investment)."
Original cost is primarily an equity concept, based upon the rationale
that the investor has made a specific commitment of funds upon which
he is entitled to a stipulated rate of return.Original cost also has a
concreteness which facilitates administration.Such administrative
convenience became a paramount consideration in the thirties when
the literal interpretation of reproduction cost threatened the breakdown
of effective regulation.
In a period of changing prices, however, neither the investor nor the
consumer are likely to be well served by the original cost approach.
The equity investor under such circumstances receives essentially a
fixed monetary and a declining real return unless the permitted regu-
latory rate of return is promptly altered with changing price levels.
Furthermore, unlike that for the bondholder, the fixed monetary return
for equity holders in regulated industries is created by the regulatory
process rather than by a clearly understood contract. The consumer,
though, realizes at least short-run gains from the reduction in the real
value of the investor's return.
However, these short-run gains of the consumer are achieved
through earnings insufficient to maintain adequate service in the long
run. Once it becomes clear that the equity investor in a regulated
industry can receive only a fixed monetary return, equity investments
normally will be forthcoming only with extremely high average returns.
In the transitional period from the current return to a higher return,
Long-term debt plus net worth represents a variation of the depreciated original
cost rate base.Itdoes have the additional advantage of being based directly on
accounting records and frees the regulatory process from the necessity of a physical
inventory for equipment.It also takes automatic recognition of working capital
which is, however, generally included in the other two rate bases. All subsequent
comments made about the depreciated, original-cost rate base apply virtually
without modification to long-term debt, plus net worth.A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 203
the regulated industry is likely to be starved for capital necessary for
expansion. The probable final result of such developments for the
consumer will be both higher prices to pay a higher average return (to
compensate the equity investor for risks which are not offset by any
possibility of increased returns) and transitional periods of inadequate
service.There is the further danger that the existence of inadequate
service and the necessity of a higher rate of return may never be
recognized, so that the consumer is perpetually deprived of sufficient
capacity and the technologically best equipment.
It was this aspect of inflation that led to the introduction of the
reproduction cost concept in the 1920's.Reproduction cost, by in-
creasing profits in an inflationary period, will contribute to the main-
tenance of long-run adequate service.It provides an "automatic"
solution to the problem of earnings dilution caused by the disparity
between old and new investment costs in a period of changing price
levels.Reproduction cost also treats alike companies with a different
timing in their pattern of purchasing equipment. Uniformity can be
important here because under conditions of secular inflation, failure to
use reproduction cost or some other price correction is likely to inhibit
most the earnings of those who most need to raise outside capital,
i.e., firms with the oldest equipment.
however, are a smaller source of funds for purchasing new
equipment in most regulated industries than the funds generated by
depreciation. The underlying notion of a depreciation allowance is a
flow of funds that will enable a firm to maintain its capital stock. If
the prices of equipment are unchanged and the life of the equipment
is estimated correctly, then depreciation practices based on original
or historical cost achieve this objective.Obviously, though, price
changes nullify the concept of original cost depreciation just as they
eliminate the utility of an original cost rate base in regulating profits.
If prices are rising, original cost depreciation may be insufficient to
replace equipment, so that reinvestment either from new funds or
retained earnings is required merely to maintain capital stocks at present
levels.5 This problem is not peculiar to the regulated industries, but the
nonregulated companies can to some extent offset a depreciation
deficiency with the higher profits which usually accompany inflation.
Strictly speaking, this will hold true .only in declining or stagnant situations
because, in expanding industries, price increases will be offset at least partly by
depreciation expenses rising more rapidly than replacement needs. The depreciation
allowance pertains under expansionary circumstances to a larger capital stock than
replacement needs because of the lag between initiating depreciation charges and
actual replacement.204 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
Regulated companies do not have this option unless regulatory action
is unusually prompt and perceptive.
While the determination of depreciation by reproduction cost faces
up to the problems of inflation, the approach has had a dismal history
in regulatory practice.During the 1920's, reproduction cost was
interpreted so literally by regulatory commissions that existing equip-
ment was assumed to be reproduced even if the equipment was obsolete,
and more efficient and lower cost processes were available.This
deprived the consumer of all technological gains.Furthermore, the
establishment of reproduction cost relied upon the testimony of expert
witnesses as to the current costs of reproduction; a cumbersome and
subjective procedure that often better served the welfare of expert
witnesses than consumers.
THE OPERATING RATIO AS A MEASURE OF PROFITS
The public utility industries in which many regulatory practices were
first formulated were, at least historically, relatively risk free.As a
result, regulation could ignore the possibility of losses and concentrate
on profits. When regulation was extended to the more competitive
transport sectors of motor trucking and buses, the economic character of
these industries required some explicit recognition of risk. In this context
the operating ratio approach was evolved, utilizing as a regulatory
standard of reasonable profits the ratio of expenses to gross revenue.6
The rationale of the operating ratio primarily insures that short-run,
unforeseen developments do not result in costs approaching or ex-
ceeding revenues so as to sharply reduce or eliminate profits.This
arises in motor trucking and bus transport for two reasons: first, both
expenses and revenues show relatively large year-to-year changes;
second, the gap between revenues and operating expenses is extremely
small. This last arises from the fact that capital is a small part of the
total production process.7
For example, if an operating ratio of 93 per cent in motor carriers serves to
indicate a reasonable profit, when expenses are more than 93 per cent of revenues,
a rate increase is indicated, and when expenses are less, a rate decrease is indicated.
For example, the operating ratio in electric utilities (the prototype of the tradi-
tional utility involving large amounts of capital per sales dollar) in the decade 1946
to 1959 varied from a low of 83.3 to a high of 86.6—a range of 3.3 per cent—whereas
buses with a small capital input per unit of sale varied from a low of 88.1 to a high
of 96.1 per cent—a range of 8 per cent. In addition to a wider range in the variation
of the operating ratio, the same variation in operating ratio causes a larger fluctuation
in profits in an industry like buses than in electric utilities. For example, the same
absolute change in operating ratio for electric utilities and buses from 1948 to 1949
(2.2 per cent) caused bus profits per unit of sales to decrease 26 per cent, whereas the
electric utility profits decreased only 12 per cent.A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 205
In the operating ratio approach to regulation, profits provide a
margin against financial crisis; that is, an insurance premium against
unexpected losses. In the bus and trucking industry, the breadth
of the allowed safety margin, profits usually have remained sufficient
to meet the extremely small capital requirements of the industry.
Though often suggested, a wider use of the operating ratio approach
to regulation is undesirable for at least two reasons.First, it ignores
the important problem of capital requirements which, as stated above,
is a minor matter in the bus and trucking industries, but not for most
other regulated industries.Second, there is no reason why a safety
margin may not be provided by an adjustment in the rate of return.
In fact, the historical explanation for the use of the operating ratio
approach in the motor carrier industry may have been a reluctance to
directly set a rate of return sufficiently large to compensate the investors
for the risks involved.Aside from such considerations of adminis-
trative hesitancy, there is no reason why regulatory agencies should not
recognize that some regulated industries involve very high risks and
hence should be allowed to earn a rate of return greatly in excess of
other regulated industries with lesser risk.
FINANCIAL RATE OF RETURN
The profit measures just outlined all share a common defect:they
include no explicit recognition of the time element in investment. The
time element can be explicitely recognized through the use of the
discounted present value formula. Assuming that an investment is
made at one point in time and is independent of all other relevant
investment possibilities, and assuming that interest is compounded at
regular intervals, the present value formula can be expressed in simple
notational form as:
V = +r)t
whereV represents the present value of the investment;indicates the
annuity or profit or be realized at future time t; rstandsfor the interest
rate; and t indicates the number of interest computation periods that
separate the present (or point of investment time) from the time of the
profit realization.It should be noted that P represents the total cash
return(ina given time period) to be realized from the investment so it
is not net of depreciation expense.
The traditional application of the discounted present value formula
has been to determine the profitability of an investment in capital
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One procedure (the so-called benefit-cost ratio approach) is to compute
present value just as above and then compare this with the cost of the
investment; if present value exceeds cost (the benefit-cost ratio exceeds
unity), the investment is considered profitable at the accepted or going
rate of interest employed in the formula. The second procedure is to
use the cost of the investment in place of present value in the left-hand
side of the equation and to solve the equation for r which then is
considered to be the earnable rate of return rather than the interest rate.
If the rate of return computed in this fashion is greater than the interest
rate, the investment is considered to be profitable.
Since different results can be obtained by using these alternative
approaches to capital budgeting, considerable controversy exists about
their relative merits.8In general, if maximization of V is the basic
objective (which would seem to be quite plausible if consumer sover-
eignty is accepted), then the benefit-cost ratio will yield the best results
in the widest variety of circumstances. Neither approach is infallible,
even in pursing narrowly and correctly stipulated objectives, if the
simplifying "point of time" and independence assumptions are
mated; with interdependence between different investments over time,
more complex techniques are required.9
The rate-of-return approach also suffers from a specific limitation;
multiple solutions can exist for the present value formula when solved
for r (the usual algorithm being Newton's approximation), specifically
when P assumes negative values over some part of the time horizon.
This limitation, together with the fact that the benefit-cost approach
better serves the more plausible objective function, suggests that the
rate-of-return calculation is the less useful of the two possibilities for
capital budgeting purposes.
These limitations, however, are not serious objections to the use of
the rate-of-return approach in regulatory problems.The multiple
solution characteristic of rate-of-return calculationsis not a real
disability because the established "fair rate of return" is in practice an
approximation to the correct answer, thus supplying outside information
for choosing between different solutions where more than one exists. In
fact, as long as the benefit-cost ratio exceeds unity at a zero rate of
interest (i.e., the simple sum of benefits exceeds the simple sum of costs)
BExcellentdiscussions of these problems can be found in Jack Hirschiefer, "On
the Theory of Optimal Investment Decision," Journal of Political Economy, August
1958, pp. 329—352; and Management of Corporate Capital, Ezra Solomon, ed.,
Glencoe, III., 1954.
S. Marglin, A Linear Programming Approach to Dynamic Capital Budgeting,
Rotterdarn, 1962.A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 207
the "correct" rate of return will almost invariably be the lowest positive
solution rate.
Once this is recognized, itis also obvious that the two capital
budgeting approaches are usually identical when applied to regulatory
decisions. If the rate-of-return approach is used, the calculation simply
reduces to determining whether the lowest positive (or otherwise correct)
solution rate is above or below the established "fair rate." Of course,
if the benefit-cost approach were employed directly, the procedure.
would be to determine whether the benefit-cost ratio were above or
below unity at the established fair rate.'°
As long as the two approaches yield the same result, the rate-of-return
approach has the advantage of being more in keeping with established
regulatory traditions. Like the current practice, it involves computing
a rate of return under an established rate structure and then comparing
this with what is considered to be a just or equitable rate of return for
investors in regulated enterprises.If the computed risgreater than
the desired "just" return, the required regulatory action is to adjust
tariffs downward, and thereby the P term as well, to make requalto the
established standard. Conversely, a rate of return beheath the target
rate calls for regulatory action to increase F, usually by upward rate
adjustments, to a point where the computed requalsthe standard or
accepted r.
DefinitionalProblems Encountered in
Computing Rates of Return
and Operating Ratios
Definitional problems have been a major difficulty in the regulatory
use of either rate-of-return or operating ratio formulas. Indeed, a good
part of the voluminous record in protracted rate hearings is devoted to
disputes over definitions.
Two key definitional problems in computing gross returns on profits
for regulated industries are, first, whether capital gains on inventories,
fixed assets, and other investments should be counted; and second,
whether returns realized on nonregulated, by-product operations should
be considered in regulatory proceedings.
10Toput the argument somewhat differently, the distinction between the rate-of-
return and the benefit-cost approaches to capital budgeting are the different rankings
ofcapital outlays that the two approaches yield, and these rankings are irrelevant in
the regulatory context. What counts for regulation is whether the existing set of
facts pertaining to only oneinvestmentsituation are consistent with an adequate
compensation to capital.208 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
The capital gains problem as it occurs in defining gross return can
be divided into two subproblems: (1) capital gains or losses realized in
the course of normal operations from price level changes on the capital
goods and inventories employed in the regulated production process,
and (2) capital gains or losses realized on the basis of speculation in the
commodities and capital goods employed by the regulated industries.
Normal capital gains or losses of the first type ought to be built into
the rate base and regulatory calculations, since such capital changes
are as integral a part of furnishing utility services as operating costs.
For the second type of capital gains the obvious test is whether entry
into the speculative activity that yields the gain or loss is restricted by
grant of public franchise. If entry into speculative activities is open to
both regulated and nonregulated firms, the profits and losses from these
activities should be considered beyond regulatory purview. To illus-
trate, the grant of a unique franchise to operate an airline between
two urban centers does not bestow on an airline an exclusive right to
engage in speculation in plane prices. Not only can airlines operating
between other points engage in such speculation but also private firms
outside the airline industry can join in the speculation.Excluding
speculative capital gains and losses, it might be noted, considerably
simplifies the administrative problem facing regulatory agencies.
On the other hand, this simple test only applies to speculative
activities sufficiently limited not to jeopardize the financial stability of
the regulated firms or industries. The mass speculation that character-
ized substantial parts of the electric utilities industry in the 1920's
must inevitably be passed on to consumers, either through higher rates
to bail out the speculators or through inadequate service from bankrupt
companies. The better remedy here, however, is direct control of
financing or refinancing rather than through adjustments in profit
measures.
The by-product or subsidiary activity problem—such as when rail-
roads own hotels, oil wells, and timber lands—is relatively easy to solve
analytically.Again, the test is whether the grant of a public utility
franchise bestows upon the firm substantial market power in another
sector of the economy. Such would be the case where the by-product
can be economically manufactured only in conjunction with the supply
of the regulated service. Of course, if the revenues of nonregulated
activities are excluded from regulatory calculations, so too should be
their costs and related productive assets.
While the principle is obvious, there may be substantial difficulties
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between the regulated and nonregulated activities of the firm. Other-
wise, a regulated firm might render services to a subsidiary at in-
ordinately low prices, or conversely, purchase at inordinately high
prices, thus redistributing profits from the regulated to the non-
regulated sector of the firm's activities.Considerations of this kind
are central to many regulatory disputes in the telephone industry.
In essence, the problem of defining costs is one of broader significance
in regulatory proceedings when there is a less than competitive market
for certain of the factors utilized in the production process. Without
a competitive market it is, by definition, difficult to establish a going
market price to use as the "cost" paid by the regulated firm.In
extreme cases, the only recourse is to assume that a "fair price"
represents costs of production plus a "fair return," thus placing the
industries supplying regulated industries in much the same situation as
the regulated industries themselves. In less extreme cases, such as the
bilateral oligopoly that characterizes the equipment markets for some
utilities and airlines, extending regulation is presumably not worth
the effort, and it is better to rely on competition despite its imperfections.
Somewhat more tangible are the problems of defining appropriate
depreciation charges for regulated industries.For example, there is
considerable reluctance to count depreciation expenses as a cost when
gross assets is used as the denominator of the rate-of-return ratio.(It
is usually agreed that depreciation should be counted as an expense
when net fixed assets is employed as the rate base.)
One approach to solving this definitional problem is to compare the
results obtained by including or excluding depreciation with those
obtained by using the present value formula.In general, results
obtained from the established regulatory measures can be converted
into present value equivalents and thus directly compared with each
other and with the rate of return found from the present value formula.
Such a set of comparisons is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 for
a case in which the rate of return calculated using the present value
formula is 10 per cent. The upper hyperbolic-shaped function indicates
the gross profit (on gross investment) return that must be earned in
order that a 10 per cent financial rate of return on capital be realized.
Similarly, the lower function indicates the rate of return that must be
earned when using net profit (that is, when depreciation, calculated on
a straight-line basis, Is included as an expense, and gross investment is
still used as the base) to obtain the 10 per cent financial return.
in general, if depreciation is counted as an expense, the rate-of-return
ratio, with gross assets as a base, underestimates the true return.Conversely, if depreciation expense is not subtracted,the reported returns
are overestimated. Which of the two functions deviates least from the
"true financial rate" depends on the economic life of the equipment
involved. Both give reasonably good results if the durability of the
equipment is great enough, for the functions converge on the true rate
as the length of equipment life increases. For equipment of very low
durability, the deduction of depreciation expense yields answers closer
to the true rate. At an intermediate range of durability, the retention
of depreciation expense in the returns yields better estimates than its
subtraction. As a rule, as the expected equipment life increases, the
gross profit ratio converges to the true rate more quickly than the net
profit ratio.
The preceding propositions have been based on a straight-line
computation of depreciation expenses. With a declining-balance com-
putation of depreciation, the analysis is slightly more complicated.
Different effects can be achieved by the declining-balance method
depending on the age distribution of the equipment stock and the
relative productivity of the equipment in different periods of its life
span.In the simplest case, declining-balance depreciation might
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accurately reflect declining productivity of the equipment. Under such
circumstances, changes over time in revenue and depreciationexpense
would roughly cancel, yielding a good approximation ofa constant
annuity. This, of course, is a special case and could not be expected
to hold as a general rule.
It is useful to note that the different results obtained from various
regulatory rate-of-return formulas can be readily converted intoone
another and also into the true financial return. Accordingly, the choice
of the particular measure used for regulatory purposes does not matter
if it is made with a knowledge of these transformation relationships.
For reference, a number of transpositions betweenmeasures of profit-
ability on a gross asset base, with and without depreciation countedas
an expense, and the financial rate of return have been brought together
in Table 1.
Depreciation charges play a quite different role when operating ratios
are the basis of regulation. The central consideration is the relationship
of depreciation expenses to total costs, since the main economic
TABLE1
RATESOF RETURN ON GROSSASSETS, WiTH ANDWITHOUT
DEPRECIATIONEXPENSE COUNTED IN pROFITSa, COMPARED




















2 53.0 3.0 56.1 6.1 57.6 7.6
4 27.6 2.6 30.2 5.2 31.5 6.5
6 19.1 2.4 21.7 5.0 23.0 6.3
10 12.3 2.3 14.9 4.9 16.3 6.3
15 9.0 2.3 11.7 5.0 13.2 6.5
20 7.4 2.4 10.2 5,2 11.7 6.7
30 5.8 2.5 8.9 5.6 10.6 7.3
40 5.1 2.6 8.4 5.9 10.2 7.7
50 4.7 2.7 8.2 6.2 10.1 8.1
aDepreciation expense estimated by straight—line methods.
bAs estimatedby using the present value formula.212 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
rationale for the use of the operating ratio is the provision against
bankruptcy and capital exhaustion from short-run fluctuations in
profits. If the ratio of depreciation expense (and indeed of other book
charges as well) is large relative to total cost, the firm has a cushion
against sudden swings in revenue. Relatively large negative accounting
profits are not accompanied by a cash drain on company funds unless
revenue falls below total cost minus book charges. Thus, a high rate
of book charges to total costs reduces the probability of cash drains
because of random fluctuations in profit levels.
Another definitional question bedevilling rate-of-return calculations
is whether unadjusted gross fixed assets or gross fixed assets minus
depreciation reserves (net fixed assets) should be employed as the rate
base. When net fixed assets are used as the base, it is usually accepted
that depreciation expenses should first be subtracted from profits
before computing the ratio and this procedure will be assumed through-
out the following discussion. Defined as the ratio of net profits to net
fixed assets, the rate of return becomes a good approximation of what
is commonly known in capital budgeting procedures as net return on
average investment. This is simply the ratio of profits after taxes and
depreciation to one half the total investment. Indeed, the two measures
should yield roughly identical results in the long run, that is, when
averaged over the complete life of the assets involved.
When compared with the time rate of return obtained by using the
present value formula, the net return on average investment uniformly
overestimates the profitability of an investment (when profits are
assumed to be evenly spread over the economic life of the equipment
and straight-line depreciation is used). This overestimate is not too
serious when economic life is short and when the correct rate of return
islow, but itbecomes progressivelyworse as economic life isextendedand
the true rate of return increases. These results are illustrated in Table 2.
Furthermore (again assuming straight-line depreciation and the even
spread of profits over expected economic life), the use of net fixed
assets. as a rate base underestimates the true return during the early
years after a re-equipment period and overestimates the true return
toward the end of equipment or just before a new re-equipment
period occurs. When investments in equipment are made only at
widely spaced periods in time, and then in very concentrated amounts,
the average or long-term rate of return indicated in Table 2 will be
realized as an instantaneous (i.e., a particular annual) rate of return
only at the mid-point between re-equipment periods. Rates of return
computed on net fixed assets under such circumstances will essentiallyA FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 213
TABLE 2
RATE OF RETURNa ON AVERAGE INVESTMENT OR ON
NET FIXEDASSETS WITH A UNIFORM AGE DISTRIBUTION






b Rate of Return(per cent)
4 8 10 12
2 4.03 8.1 10.2 12.2
4 4.08 8.3 10.5 12.7
6 4.13 8.5 10.8 13.1
10 4.24 8.9 11.4 14.0
15 4.36 9.4 12,2 15.0
20 4.50 9.9 12.8 16.0
30 4.74 10.7 14.1 17.6
40 4.98 11.5 15.1 18.8
50 5.2]. 12.1 15.9 19.7
aNet of depreciation expense estimated on a straight—line
basis.
e8timated from the present value formula.
followa sawtooth pattern; right after re-equipment the rate of return
will drop sharply and then rise slowly in a linear fashion until it reaches
a peak just before the new re-equipment period. At this point, the
instantaneous rate of return will again drop and the process will be
repeated.Furthermore, for growth industries,like the telephone
industry and many utilities, a net fixed asset base will persistently
underestimate the true financial rate.
Other biases, of course, may occur if profits are not uniformly dis-
tributed over the life of an asset or if straight-line depreciation is not
used.For example, if gross profits decline more rapidly than de-
preciation allowances accrue, the rate of return computed on net fixed
assets would in the long run underestimate the true rate of return. The
instantaneous rate-of-return problem also still exists;the ratios of
profits to net fixed assets under such circumstances would tend to be
too great in the early years and too low in the later years.
Similarly, if net fixed assets decline more rapidly than profits, a rate
of return based on net fixed assets will result, on the average, in an even214 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
more serious overestimate of true profitability than when profits are
spread evenly over economic life;in the early years of the investment
the average lifetime return will be very much underestimated while in
the late years, just before re-equipment, the converse will hold true.
This situation may occur when the introduction of new equipment is
associated with learning costs that reduce profits in the early years of an
investment.
Another question often raised in defining the rate base is whether
working capital should be included. The usual practice has been to
include it when the depreciated value of the equipment is employed as
the rate base but not when gross original or replacement value is used.
As a general rule, it would seem preferable to include working capital
as part of the rate base and specifically recognize that it has a different
economic life than physical equipment (i.e., it usually has a salvage
value of 100 per cent). Working capital is as important a part of the
production process as any other kind of investment and to omit it is
the same as omitting part of the required investment needed to earn
whatever profit is realized.
In addition, separate treatment probably should be given to returns
on working capital because such investments are usually relatively
liquid and consequently open to substantially less risk exposure than
fixed investments in equipment. In other words, everything else equal,
a regulatory body could justify a somewhat lower rate of return on total
investment, including working capital, for industries with a substan-
tially higher than average proportion of their assets in working capital.
A final class of definitional problems arises if reproduction costs
rather than original costs are used as a rate base. Determination of
reproduction cost necessitates a definition of the unit of productive
capacity to be reproduced, which in turn raises the question of the
treatment of technological change.
Regulatory agencies usually have defined reproduction costs in terms
of reproducing the specific equipment now in use, thus excluding the
effect of technical change.Strictly applied, reproduction cost could
mean, for example, asking such irrelevant questions as what it would
cost today to manufacture a DC-3, a boxcar without roller bearings,
and interstate buses without diesel engines. It would be better to frame
the reproduction cost question directly in terms of what it costs to
create equipment capable of producing a specific unit of output. This
would avoid a host of irrelevancies in rate cases,, as well as a strong
tendency toward reserving most of the gains of technological change
for producers.A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 215
Of course, defining the appropriate unit of output is not always easy.
First, a number of dimensions are usually needed to properly or fully
define output in a service industry like transportation; e.g., in passenger
services some distinction usually must be made between seat-miles of
capacity for different trip lengths, since equipment efficient at one trip
length may be very different in many important respects from that
efficient at other lengths.Second, changes in technology alter the
inherent properties of individual "capacity units" over time.For
instance, faster plane speeds clearly make a passenger seat-mile of
capacity in a jet worth more than a passenger seat-mile of capacity in
a DC-3. This raises the question of how these gains should be dis-
tn buted.
In general, administrative convenience and equity are usually both
well served by adopting some conventional and simple measure of
output and adhering to it with reasonable consistency. If reproduction
costs are controlled in terms of producing equipment capable of a
certain output of services, the usual consequence will be to split
technological gains between producers and consumers in, admittedly,
some rough and ready fashion.This occurs because most (though
certainly not all) technological improvements result in producing a
better product at lower cost. For example, jets produce a faster service
for consumers and lower operating costs for airlines; similarly, roller
bearings in boxcars result in a more dependable service for shippers and
lower operating costs for railroads; and heavy diesel buses usually
have superior riding and other comforts as well as lower operating costs.
At a minimum, defining reproduction cost in terms of a constantly
improving service unit rather than in terms of actually reproducing a
specific piece of equipment is a way of increasing the probability of
transmitting to the consumer some share of the technological gains.
Since reasonable profits and prices could be computed on the most
efficient and newest equipment, a service-unit approach to computing
reproduction cost also would provide a built-in incentive for manage-
ments to adapt to technological change. Furthermore, the adminis-
trative difficulties in the strict reproduction-cost approach are largely
eliminated.
The use of a simple index of the production cost of an ever-improving
unit of output is not, however, an automatic cure-all. Depending on
the particular character of technological advance in an industry and
the type of price index employed, the gains will be shared differently
by the different participants.It remains a central problem to decide
whether the results are equitable.216 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
Despite the difficulties in computing capital reproduction costs, the
effort would seem well worthwhile as long as it is accepted as a regula-
tory objective that the capital stock of a regulated industry should be
maintained. At the very minimum, reference should be made to some
sort of general price index for capital goods even if a specific index for
the regulated industry appears impossible to construct.The only
alternative to making a determination of capital costs is to adjust the
rate of return upward when price increases occur; but these will provide
only rough approximations of actual requirements unless the adjust-
ments are based on cost and price indexes.
Some Empirical Applications
On the basis of the preceding analysis, the simplest way to construct
somewhat improved estimates of rates of return from normally available
balance sheets and income statements would be to:(a) use as a rate
base the sum of stockholders' equity (paid-in capital and surplus,
retained earnings,etc.), long-term debt, and accrued depreciation
reserves;(b) define profits (for the numerator of the rate-of-return
ratio) as normal accounting profits realized on activities under or
closely associated with regulation, plus interest charges and depreciation
expenses;(c) take explicit cognizance of the role and influence of
capital longevity by making corrections in rate-of-return ratios (as
defined by (a) and (b) above) so as to convert them to closer approxi-
mations of the internal rate of return that would be obtained by solving
the present value formula; (d) take into account the particular differ-
ences in the durability of working capital and physical investments;
and (e) correct the rate base for price, or at least take cognizance of the
possibility of price inflation by attempting to measure any changes that
occur in the cost of capital needed to produce specified units of output.
We will present, first, various bits and pieces of information pertinent
to the price correction problem and, second, rough comparisons of
rates of return realized in several transportation industries with those
realized in several regulated and unregulated sectors of American
industry in recent years. While these estimates will be crude in several
respects, the most serious omission is the lack of appropriate price
corrections for the rate bases. Accordingly, the number reported are
directly comparable only to the extent that different sectors of industry
have approximately the same historical age composition of their capital
asset structures and have experienced similar price histories or price
stability in their capital equipment acquisition markets over recent orA FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 217
relevant years.1' We excuse ourselves from applying price deflation to
accounting values on capital assets because it is an empirical task
beyond our resources.It requires unpublished data on the historical
distribution of capital asset acquisitions in order to determine the
appropriate weights to assign to the index for all relevantpreceding years.
These illustrations are, therefore, necessarily incomplete and are
intended primarily to indicate what is possible rather than as sources
for drawing substantive conclusions. The usefulness of these figures,
however, might be easily underestimated. With all their imperfections
and inadequacies, they are probably superior to most existing profit
measures used by regulatory agencies. Furthermore, in many instances
the differences between series compared are so large that no possible
bias could alter significantly the more obvious conclusions or infer-
ences.Still, care is required in their interpretation and it is hoped
that their imperfections will be a challenge to others to undertake
needed improvements.
PRICE INFORMATION AND INDEXES FOR TRANSPORTATION
The preceding discussion of reproduction cost developed two con-
•clusions.First, that an adjustment in the rate base to recognize the
possible impact of inflation was essential, and second, that such an
adjustment could be best achieved by a price index (preferably based
on a unit of service whose quality is continually improving) rather than
the administratively cumbersome application of the concept of re-
production cost.
There are three types of price index which might be used in the
adjustment of the rate base and hence profits: (1) a consumer or cost
of living index, (2) a general producers' durable equipment index, and
(3) specific indexes of equipment prices. The personal consumption
index adjusts the rate base to stabilize the real income or purchasing
power returns realized by investors. The other two indexes, in contrast,
adjust the rate base to maintain the purchasing power of reinvested
earnings.Since retained earnings as a source of reinvestment funds
have become increasingly important, the maintenance of the purchasing
power of profits in terms of reinvestment deserves at least equal
priority with the maintenance of investors' real income.
Jf the particular prices paid for capital by a given industry follow
the general pattern, the price index of producers' durable equipment
Ofcourse, there might be other fortuitous combinations of circumstances in
which relative price movements and historical capital acquisition patterns would
make the numbers directly comparable even without price correction.218 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
used in national income accounts will, of course, more or less maintain
the purchasing power of profits in terms of reinvestment. This index
represents the price changes in a wide cross section of capital equipment
(machinery, tools, vehicles), and investments in regulated industries
generally fall within the categories included. Furthermore, since the
typical division of profitsis roughly equal between reinvestment
(retained earnings) and dividends, and depreciation expense is usually
about equal to retained earnings, the consumer price index and the
producers' durable equipment index might be given, as a first rough
approximation, weights of one and two, respectively, in the construction
of a general composite index of price changes for the adjustment of rate
bases. Such an index is shown in Table 3, with 1946 selected as the
base year. The figures suggest a steady erosion in the value of profit
dollars, though at a slow pace since 1957.
The index of prices of all producers' durable equipment, however,
may often be an inadequate representation of the price changes in the
equipment bought in a particular industry, especially since the general
index does not reflect technological change in a particular industry
(or, for that matter, in industry in general). For example, as shown in
Table 4, unit of productive capacity costs for airplanes, as measured
TABLE3




Personal Consumption Producers' Durable +
Year Expenditures Equipment 66.7% of(3)
—(1) (2) (3) (4)
1946 100.0 100.0 100.0
1947 119.3 114.1 115.5
1948 126.1 123.3 124.0
1949 125.0 129.3 127.7
1950 126.7 132.0 130.2
1951 135.4 143.4 140.6
1952 137.5 144.2 141.7
1953 139.3 145.8 143.3
1954 140.5 146.3 144.6
1955 140.8 150.5 146.3
1956 142.1 160.0 154.0
1957 147.8 169.5 162.3
1958 150.5 174.0 166.2
1959 152.5 177.8 169.4
1960 155.0 178.0 170.3
Source;U.S. Department of Commerce, of Curi'ent Business,
July1956, p. 6, and July1962, p. 8.A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 219
for 1947—55 by prices paid for the DC-6 and DC-6B which represent
efficient equipment in medium-range service, have increased less than
the producers' capital equipment price index. Indeed, as can be seen
by looking at column 8 of Table 4, the costs of this type of medium-
range, four-engine plane capacity were remarkably stable over those
years and, if anything, actually declined.The indexes reported in
Table 4, it should be noted, reflect changes in the utilization patterns
of the equipment as well as price changes.
A decline in the actual price of medium-range plane capacity is even
more evident in more current data. In 1960, the equipment with the
lowest operating costs in medium range operations would appear to
be the Lockheed Electra.This plane in a conventional First-Tourist
configuration has approximately 40 to 50 per cent more seating capacity
than the DC-6B and, except for the period when its operating speeds
were reduced for safety reasons, operated at about a 33 per cent higher
over-all cruising speed. Such figures imply that one Electra is the equal
in units of seats of available capacity to two DC-6B's, as long as the
Electra can achieve the same number of hours of daily utilization as
the DC-6B. Except for the safety problems in 1959 and 1960, the
Electra, with its simple turbo-prop propulsion, should achieve a higher
rate of utilization than its reciprocating engine predecessors; it should
be remembered, moreover, that the DC-6 also had substantial safety
problems in its early years. The Electra when new (in 1958) cost between
$2.3 and $2.4 million, so that an approximate 100 per cent increase in
capacity was bought at a 50—60 per cent increase in price. In 1962, a
used Electra in good condition cost about$1.3million, partially
reflecting the fact that even more efficient and lower cost medium- and
short-range capacity was shortly expected in pure jets.
The advent of jets into long-range service also has kept unit costs of
this type of capacity more or less constant. Both the Boeing 707 and
the DC-S represent 50 per cent more seating capacity than their pre-
decessors, the DC-7 and the Constellation, and are at least 60 per cent
faster.Again, given only equal hours of utilization, this makes each
DC-8 or 707 at least equal to 2.5 DC-7's in terms of available capacity.
Since DC-7's cost about $2.5 million when new and the DC-8 and 707
have averaged about $6 million in price, the price ratio is also about 2.5.
In short, it would be difficult to argue that the capital costs of airline
capacity have risen markedly in recent years since, if anything, they
have probably declined.Given the difficulties mentioned earlier of
gaining acceptance of downward price corrections and, more impor-
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inrecent years, rates of return uncorrected for capacity price changes
are probably reasonably legitimate and acceptable for evaluating airline
operations at the moment.
Rather similar price stability for equipment purchases is observable
in railroading. In that industry, however, it is more difficult to arrive
at over-all impressions of equipment price behavior since so many more
types of equipment are involved in a railroad operation than in an
airline operation. However, there has been remarkable price stability
in the last five years in several important categories of railroad equip-
ment. For example, using actual purchase prices for specific pieces of
equipment, since 1957 there has been at most a 5 per cent upward
revision in the price of diesel switch and road engines, steel rail, boxcars,
and specialized freight rolling stock.Since there have been improve-
ments, in some cases of quite great significance, in the productivity of
some of these categories of equipment, this relative price stability
strongly suggests that the price per unit of railroad productive capacity
may have declined slightly in recent years.
Some relevant figures on equipment utilization and operating effi-
ciency of railroads are given in Table 5 along with some highly aggregate
indexes relating to railroad equipment prices for the years 1953 through
1962. The price indexes reflect both price increases and some change,
usually a quality upgrading, in the mix of equipment used. The year
1953 is a good base year for efficiency and price comparisons because
it essentially eliminates most Korean War effects. The figures in Table 5
suggest that there has been a minimum 10 per cent increase in the
efficiency of utilizing railroad equipment and probably substantially
more. These figures are to be contrasted with approximate percentage
increases in prices for the major types of railroad equipment during the
same period: 11 per cent for diesel engines; 15 per cent for steel rail;
and 43.5 per cent for freight cars. In large measure, the greater increase
in freight car prices represents a substantial upgrading in the quality
of cars obtained. In particular, railroad interchange rules were modified
several years ago to substitute solid bearings for waste packings in
freight car journals; these rules become fully effective only on May I,
1962 (with the dramatic result, as shown in Table 5, that freight car
miles per hotbox rose sharply in 1962) but have been anticipated
in equipment procurement practices and prices for several years.
Modern freight cars also have several other loading and maintenance
cost advantages over those available a decade ago and very often provide
a much higher quality of service to the shipper. The net impression is







Car Per Freight Ton Index Price
Net Ton Miles Hotbox Train Miles for Index
Miles Per (Monthly Miles Per Diesel for
Per Freight Due in Per Freight ElectricFreight
Loaded Train June of Train Train Loco— Train
Year Car Mile Mile each year) Hour Hour motives Cars
1953 32.1 63.2 n.a. 18.2 51,750 191 443
1954 31.4 65.0 n.a. 18.7 53,897 191 450
1955 32.1 66.2 n.a. 18.6 55,770 191 468
1956 33.0 67.2 n.a. 18.6 57,071 200 516
1957 33.4 69.3 n.a. 18.8 59,218 210 562
1958 33.0 70.7 n.a. 19.2 60,807 210 594
1959 33.3 69.6 n.a. 19.5 61,924 210 612
1960 34.0 70.2 159,354 19.5 63,096 210 619
1961 34.7 71.0 293,338 19.9 65,621 211 625
1962 (9
months) 35.7 71.5 938,576 20.0 67,491 211 635
Percentage
Change
1953—62 11.2 11.4 10.0 31.0 11.0 43.5
Source:Operatin8 efficiency data are from 3. Elmer Monroe,'1962 Review of
Railway Operations," Railway Age, January 7/14 1963, pp. 87—93.Price indices for
the years 1953 through 1960 are from the American Association of Railroads Joint
Equipment Conmittee Report, Coats of Railroad Equipment and Machinery, July 1, 1961.
The 1961 and 1962 indexes for freight train cars are estimates made by the New York,
New Haven and Hartford Railroad; the 1961—62 values for Diesel—Electric locomotives
are estimates made by the present authors and are probably the most dubious numbers
reported in the Table.
railroadequipment prices, it has been very slight during the last ten
years.
Very much the same picture seems to hold true in trucking. In fact,
the price of aluminum-van dry-storage trailers seems to have declined
slightly, if anything, during the last ten years. It is a bit difficult, though,
to assess the productive characteristics of these trailers since, to a
certain extent, it would appear that durability has been sacrificed for
heavier revenue loadings and a reduction of operation costs through
less weight. On the other hand, the relative stability over the last decade
in the price of trailer-pulling tractors, in the face of some quite obvious
improvements in quality, strongly suggests that the cost of productive
capacity in tractor units has declined. Again, the over-all impression
is one of rough price stability in terms of costs per unit of productive
capacity.A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 223
Obviously, it would be useful to know whether technological gains
have offset capital goods price increases for other transportation
industries.Data are not readily available to answer this question;
although, if the point were raised in regulatory proceedings, the data, of
course, soon would become available.
RATES OF RETURN IN SOME REGULATED INDUSTRIES
The procedures suggested in previous paragraphs for developing
improved estimates of rates of return in regulated industries can be
applied both to individual firm and to aggregate industry data. The
results obtained by these different procedures will differ, though, and
the simple average of rates of return for individual firms generally will
not be the same as that obtained by analyzing the aggregate figures for
an entire industry.In the aggregate figures the large firms in an
industry will enter in heavily, with weights more or less proportional
to their asset values. The simple average of the individual firm ratios,
on the other hand, weights all firms equally. Which measure is the
more appropriate for general regulatory purposes is largely a matter
of opinion, being dependent upon such diverse factors as viewpoints
about the desirability of competition and its strength in maintaining
good managerial practices, the worth of maintaining small business
in the economy, and the essentiality of services in a regulated industry.
To illustrate the procedures, a fairly detailed analysis has been made
of the 1960 experiences of ten American trunk airlines (all except
Northeast) and nine of the larger international air carriers, using data
reported to the International Commercial Airlines Organization. The
results are reported in Tables 6, 7, and 8. To facilitate the computations,
the somewhat arbitrary assumption was made that the airlines con-
ducted no activities other than those that were reasonably pertinent to
or an obvious adjunct of their flight operations. All profits and costs,
whether realized from flight operations or from nonoperating items,
were considered relevant for the rate-of-return calculations.In the
case of the U.S. carriers, this means that profits and costs from such
adjunct services as supplying meals and beverages for airline passengers
and from the sale of surplus property or equipment were included and
considered to be an indistinguishable part of the regulated airline
operation. In essence, this procedure was followed not because it was
considered defensible, but rather because itgreatly simplified the
calculations from published data. Furthermore, with a few exceptions,
like American and United Airlines, the numbers involved were so small
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TABLE7
AIRLINE PROFIT CALCULATIONS











American 11.8 9.6 38.1 59.5
Braniff .7 1.9 7.8 10.4
Delta 3.1 2.7 13.9 19.7
Eastern —3.6 6.0 39.4 41.8
National —5.1 2.2 9.8 6.9
Northwest 1.6 3.2 14.4 19.2
Pan American 7.1 12.4 50.2 69.7
TWA 6.5 4.1 37.3 47.9
United 11.2 8.8 46.3 66.3
Western 2.4 1.1 9.3 12.8
Sabena 2.5 .6 7.0 10.1
TCA —— 4.2 13.7 17.9
Avianca .6 .5 1.3 2.4
Air France .2 8.6 32.4 41.2
2.7 2.4 21.6 26.7
SAS —16.2 2.8 15,1 1,7
Swissair 1.1 1.3 6.0 8.4
BEA 4.0 3.6 13.5 211
BOAC —7.1 13.3 29.8 36.0
As shown in Table 7, with these simplifications, the calculation of the
rate-of-return numerator reduces to adding interest and total depreci-
ation expenses to final net profits after income taxes.
The calculation of the rate base or denominator of the ratio is only
slightly more complicated, given the simplified procedures assumed
here. It involves adding long-term debt, capital stock, capital surplus,
unappropriated balances of profit and loss, and all reserves for depreci-
ation. The rate base calculations for the 19 airlines under analysis are
reported in Table 6.
The final step in the analysis was to divide the total profit return as
shown in the last column of Table 7 by the rate base estimate shown
in the final column of Table 6 and these quotients are recorded in
Table 8.These estimates, of course, might be converted into more
refined approximations of the "true" rate of return by using the present
value formula and taking into account the fact that airline equipment
is now estimated, at least by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, to have
an average life of six years.In the present case, it is quite clear that
performing this correction, i.e., assuming that the new Internal Revenue
Service "guideline life"iscorrect, would mean that none of the226 AFAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
TABLE8























Source:Col. 4 of Table 7 divided
by col. 7 of Table 6.
domesticor international carriers earned a positive rate of return on
their investments in the year 1960. (A break-even or zero rate of return.
would require a 16.6 per cent crude rate of return on the assumption
that airline investments have a six-year useful life.) A somewhat more
reasonable procedure might be to proceed on the old Civil Aeronautics
Board determination that the economic longevity of flight equipment is
seven years with a scrap value of 15 per cent. A seven-year life, in
addition, would not appear too out of line for airline ground equipment
as well.It would be even more legitimate and necessary to take into
account the fact that approximately 10 to 15 per cent of every dollar
invested in commercial airline operations is net working capital.
Working on the basis of these assumptions, the profit picture for
1960 airline operations is improved, but only slightly.Specifically, the
break-even rate of return is lowered to 10.7 per cent. As can be seen
in Table 8, this means that Delta, Western, Avianca, United, and
Northwest do a little better than break even, and American, KLM, and
Air France are on the margin of doing so. What these figures confirm,
of course, is something that is well known: 1960 was not a very good
year for either domestic or international airlines.A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 227
TABLE 9
RATE OF RETURN AND NET INCOME ON
RAILWAY OPERATIONS: 1953—62
Net Railway
Operating Income Net Income
Before Fixed Charges After Fixed
But After Rate of Return Charges
Depreciation on Net Investment (million
Year (million dollars) (per cent) dollars)
1953 1,109 419 903
1954 874 3.28 682
1955 1,128 4.22 927
1956 1,068 395 876
1957 922 3.36 737
1958 762 2.76 602
1959 748 2.72 578
1960 584 2.13 445
1961 538 1.97 382
1962a 652 2.39 494
Source:J. Elmer Monroe, "1962 Review of Railway Operations",
Railway Age, January 7/14, 1963.
aTwelvemonths ended September 30, 1962.
Some insight into the rates of return in aggregate on U.S. railway
operations over the last decade can be obtained from Table 9, which
reports net railway operating income, net income after fixed charges,
and the rate of return on net investment computed on the basis of the
net railway operating income (that is, exclusive of fixed charges) for
the years 1953 through 1962. As can be seen from Table 9, these rates
of return fluctuated between approximately 2 and 4.25 per cent.
Conceptually, these rates resemble the return on average investment or
net fixed assets discussed previously and shown in Table 2. As can be
seen from that table, when the average rate of return on net fixed assets
is at such a low level, it does not depart markedly from the true financial
rate of return. Thus, the financial rate of return on railway operations in
recent years has apparently fluctuated between approximately 1.90 and
4.00 per cent. These figures, however, are undoubtedly high because
railroad assets during the period were approximately 55 per cent written
off, so that a net fixed asset base results in an overstatement of the
financial return. (For further information see Table 10 where the 1960
railroad return calculated by the more accurate gross asset method is
presented.) Again, the figures document a well-known fact: railroading
has not been a prosperous business in the United States in recent years.
Aggregate rate-of-return calculations for 1960 for both Class I rail-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 231
using the gross asset method previously used with the airlines. As can
be seen, the domestic regulated industries had widely varying ex-
periences in the year 1960. The public utilities on the whole did well;
in fact, the telephone industry did very well. An intriguing feature of the
figures presented in Table 10 is the degree to which the public utilities
have relatively low depreciation reserves, usually under 30 per cent of the
gross rate base; this means that any rate of return using net assets as the
base for these industries probably will understate the true average return.
On the other hand, all the transport industries, with the lone exception
of pipelines did miserably, more or less matching the airline experience
in the same year. We have, however, several reservations about our
findings with respect to intercity trucking and, to a lesser extent, inter-
city buses.First, our calculations are based on 1960 data which, from
industry accounts, appears to have been a year of atypically low profits.
Second, the accounting data for trucking, an industry with a large
number of small firms, may be less accurate than for other regulated
industries. Finally, the economic age in the guidelines may understate
the economic life of trucking equipment. Hence, we are not sure that
our findings refute the widely held notion that trucking is a generally
profitable industry.
The recent profit situation of the transportation industries (again
with the exception of pipelines, and possibly trucking and buses)
appears at least as bad when measured against the standards of un-
regulated manufacturing industries as when measured against other
regulated industries.This is brought out by the figures shown in
Tables 11, 12, and 13. In these tables, rates of return for manufacturing
NOTESTO TABLE 11
aBasedon data for approximately 750 publicly listed corporations in these
industries.Moody's Manual of Industrtale and individual company reports
were the principal sources.
bBasedon Bulletin ?, Incc,ne TaxDepreciationand Eetimat8d
Uaeful Liv9e and Depreciation Rates, U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of
Internal Revenue (Washington, 1948) and Depreciation Guidelines and Rules,, U.S.
Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service Publication No, 456 (9—62),
Washington, 1962.
CEstimated by dividing the ratios of reported net profits togross fixed
assets by one, plus the estimated percentage needs of net working capital, and
using TableI. above (in an extended version) to convert the resulting figures
into financial rates of return.
dmese correctionswere made on the presumption that Bulletin F lives had
to be used by corporation accountants when recording depreciation, but that
the "1962 Guidelines" were Correct estimates of actual economic lives.The
undepreciated portions of gross fixed asset values left at the end of the
lives" were regarded as capital losses and considered to be 50 per
cent recouped by a reduction in corporate taxes,232 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
have been estimated both for averages of individual firms and industry
aggregates.
The individual firm averages pertain to the years 1946 through 1954
and were developed from data collected for investment studies.'2
Reported in Table 11 are simple industry averages of individual firm
net profit (after tax) returns on gross fixed assets; these averages, in
turn, have been corrected for interindustry differences in working
capital by using estimates of the average working capital needs of firms
in each individual industry.'3 The samples used in constructing these
averages covered virtually every firm in the designated industries that is
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.'4Gross
fixed assets were used as the rate base in these industries mainly because
of convenience:the investment studies for which the data were
originally collected used gross fixed assets as a deflator when making
certain cross-section statistical analyses. However, a gross fixed-asset
base has the additional advantage of being less sensitive to differences
in the ages of equipment used in different industries, thus avoiding the
saw-tooth bias problem discussed previously.
Several different estimates of the rates of return have been presented
by using different combinations of estimated useful economic lives,
and by averaging the data over different sets of years. Probably the
most pertinent figures from the standpoint of the present study are
those shown in the last two columns of Table 11 for the 195 1—54 period.
While not up-to-date, they are the most recent available from the
investment studies. One notable aspect of the numbers shown in the
table is the way in which progressive refinements of the analyses tend
to reduce the differences in the estimated rates of return in different
industries, a fact which should at least be reassuring to market econo-
mists.It should be noted, moreover, that the rates of return reported
in the table are, if anything, too low, since the most important single
remaining bias is the omission of interest payments as a return on
capital.'5
12J•R. Meyer and E. Kuh, TheInvestmentDecision, Cambridge, Mass., 1957;
andJ.R. Meyer and R. Glauber, Investment Decisions, Economic Forecasting and
PublicPolicy, Boston, 1963.
13 Theestimatesofworking capital needs are quite crudeandwere basedprimarily
on the average industry ratios of net working capital to gross fixed assets for the
individual firms in the samples for the year 1954, rounded to the next lowest quinary.
Moredetailed information on these samples can be found in Meyer and Kuh,
Investment, Chapter 3; and Meyer and Glauber, Investment Decisions, Chapter 3.
Anotherpotential source of bias working in the opposite direction, however,
is the fact that the actual depreciation practices followed by the manufacturing
corporations included in the sample probably were slightly more conservative thanA FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 233
Some 1960 financial rates of return for individual manufacturing
industries, based upon aggregate data, are reported in Table 12 and
were estimated from figures reported in the Securities and Exchange
Commission-Federal Trade Commission Quarterly Financial Report of
Manufacturing Industries.This document presents estimates of the
aggregated balance sheets and income statements for several manu-
facturing industries.In constructing the rates of return reported in
this table, essentially the same procedures were used as were used
previously when reporting estimates of financial rates of return in the
regulated industries. That is, the rate base was estimated by adding
together stockholder equity, long-term debt, and depreciation reserves;
and the profit returns were taken as the sum of net income after taxes,
depreciation expenses, and interest payments (which, however, had to
be estimated because they are not available in the FTC-SEC reports).
The numbers reported in Table 12 are not always directly comparable
with those reported in Table 11 because of slight differences in the
industry classifications employed. However, a number of direct com-
parisons are possible and, in general, it is clear that the numbers are
not too dissimilar.'6 One point that is evident from such comparisons,
though, is that rates of return, even when depreciation expense is
included as a return, apparently have declined in manufacturing in the
last ten years. However, some of the differences in the figures reported
in the two tables may also be attributable to differences in the samples
covered; the SEC-FTC Quarterly Financial Report includes returns for
many small manufacturing corporations that are not publicly listed
and may not attain as high profit levels as larger corporations.In
addition, the SEC-FTC figures covered all manufacturing industries,
including many of the less profitable industries not included in the
investment analyses and therefore not reported in Table 11.
Somewhat more direct evidence on the behavior of rates of return
in manufacturing since the end of World War II is presented in Table 13.
There, crude estimates are presented of the rates of return realized in
those implied by the "BulletinF" estimatesreported in Table 9.Specifically, the
average ratio of depreciation expense to gross fixed assets in these industries indicated
in a few instances that the useful lives actually being used for depreciation were one
to two years longer than the "Bulletin F" lives shown in the table.If this factor
were taken into account, it would tend to further depress the rate of return very
slightly; the type of adjustment involved would be essentially like that made when
moving from the "Bulletin F" to the Guideline depreciation figures as shown in the
last two columns of Table 9.
The relationships between the industrial groupings used in the investment
studies and the standard industrial classifications are explained in Meyer and Kub,





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 235
all of manufacturing, again using aggregate data obtained from the
SEC-FTC Quarterly Financial Reports. Because of a number of changes
that have been made in reporting procedures and the samples used by
the SEC and the FTC, consistent series for the entire period are difficult
to construct.It is necessary to make a number of assumptions and to
"splice" in order to join the reported numbers into a consistent set.
Furthermore, because the spliced series were created for a different
purpose than the measurements of rates of return (specifically by
Professor Locke Anderson of the University of Michigan for conducting
some investigations of financial behavior in manufacturing), no spliced
series were created for depreciation reserves or gross fixed assets, series
which would have been obviously useful for present purposes. As
before, moreover, no interest series was available.Accordingly, the
estimates developed in the table are based upon net fixed-asset rate
bases and are correspondingly somewhat cruder than those reported
previously, except for the railroad rates of return reported in Table 10
which are of the same type.In places where direct comparisons are
available between the spliced and the original series, however, spot
checks indicate that the results obtained by using the net-profit-to-net-
fixed-asset approach in estimating the rate of return are not very
different from those that would have been obtained if the net worth or
gross fixed-asset method had been used instead.
As previously pointed out, a major difficulty with the net-profit-to-
net-fixed-asset approach is that it is based on the assumption that
approximately one-half of assets are written off.TheEefore, the rates
of return are accurate only to the extent that this assumption is approx-
imated. Furthermore, the degree of approximation to this assumption
can and usually does vary over time.Some biases are probably
NOTESTO TABLE 12
aTheflow data (net profits after taxes and depreciation expense) are totals for
all.f out quarters of the designated years; the stock data (long—term debt, depreci-
ation reserves, stockholders equity, and net current assets) pertain to mid—year or
end—of—second—quarter levels.Net current assets were estimated by subtracting
total current liabilities from the total of current assets.Because no series on
interest payments was available, interest expenditures were estimated by totalling
all forms of long— and short—term debt and applying to them a factor of .06, assumed
to be the average rate of interest paid.
bEasedon Depreciation Guidelines and Rules1 U.S. Treasury Department, Internal
Revenue Service Publication No. 456 (9—62), Washington, D. C., September 1962.
financial rates of return were estimated en the basis of the useful lives
showninColumn 11, and by taking into account differences in net working capital
needs.Specifically, it was assumed that net working capital was realized in one














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 237
introduced here; e.g., a tendency toward a systematic underestimation
of the true rate of return throughout the period and particularly during
the earliest years reported. In addition, a systematic tendency toward
underestimation in the early 1950's may account for some of the
observed differences between the estimates presented in Table 13 and
those in Table 11 (although the previously reported fact that the
SEC-FTC Reports cover a much larger sector of manufacturing and
many more smaller firms are probably also at least partially responsible
for these observed differences).
However, no matter how returns in the manufacturing industry have
declined or are measured, they are still considerably larger than those
realized in transportation. Indeed, even the least prosperous of all the
manufacturing industries,thetextileindustries,dobetterthan
break even—the recent fate of most transportation industries.The
NOTESTO TABLE 13 (concluded)
CThe crude net—profit—to—asset ratio was estimated by dividing net profits
after taxes by the sum of net fixed assets plus net working capital plus
other noncurrent assets.
dThe approximate financial rates of return were estimated from the crude
net—profit—to—asset ratios by using a table of conversions like those shown
in Table 2 above.The simple conversions shown in Table 2 were modified,
however, to take account of the fact that approximately one—third of the
total investment in manufacturing is accounted for by net working capital
which is not subject to depreciation and has a 100 per cent salvage value.
Furthermore, because the depreciation—to—net—fixed—asset ratios range between
approximately .09 in the late 1940's to .11 in the late 1950's, it was
assumed thatthe net fixed assets invested inall manufacturing had an approx-
imatelife oftwenty years; such an estimate of useful life follows almost
automaticallyfrom the fact that the conversion from thecrudenet profit
rateto the financial rate of return estimateis basedontheassumptionthat
grossfixed assets are approximately one—half depreciated at all times.
While this assumption of a one—to—two ratio between net fixed assets and
gross fixed assets (or, alternatively, of depreciation reserves to gross
fixed assets) is not strictly true throughout the period, spot checks would
indicate that it is not too gross a violation of the facts.A direct calcu—
lation of the rate of return using gross fixed assets or depreciation re-
serves was impossible because these two series have not been spliced to
create a consistent set of numbers for the entire twelve—year period.
eRecause no consistent spliced series on interest payments was available,
interest expenditures were estimated by totalling all forms of long—term and
short—term debt, for which spliced series were available, and applying to
them a factor of .06, assumed to be the average rate of interest paid.
Clearly, some distortion is introduced by assuming that the average level of
interest payments were the same throughout the twelve—year period, since
they were almost surely higher during the tight monetary periods of 1954
and 1957 than during the other years, and were probably higher at the end of
the twelve years than at the beginning.However, because such a very high
percentage of total corporate debt is in the form of long—term debt, the
effective movement in the actual rate of interest paid by the corporations
was probably not too great over time.238 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
substantial differences existing between returns in the unregulated manu-
facturing industries and transportation cannot be explained, moreover,
simply on the basis of "greater risk" being faced by manufacturers.
Indeed, in industries of such marked concentration and reputed preva-
lence of "oligopolistic price leadership" as basic steel, heavy chem-
icals, and pulp and paper, there is perhaps less competition and
investment risk than in transportation.
Some Final Comments and Observations
The disparity of returns between transportation and other regulated
and unregulated industries poses some interesting questions for
economic theory and policy. Above all is the question, why investments
and servicesin transportation continue to be forthcoming when
resources allocated to these activities realize so much lower rates of
return than in other activities.
There are, of course, indications that returns on rail operations are
really notadequateto keep many of the assets presently employed In
these activities in the industry. (This, though, may not be an economi-
cally undesirable objective.) The fact that the dependability of rail
returns has been further jeopardized in recent years by the rise of new
competition from trucks, buses, and airplanes only increases this
probability.Some investments in railroading, of course, may be
justified at the margin even if average returns are quite low.
In the airline industry, the continued presence of productive facilities
apparently is due to the simple fact that very large commitments were
made to this industry in recent years on the basis of highly optimistic
expectations. While these expectations have not been borne out to any
great extent (1961 was about as bad a year as 1960 for domestic and
international airlines and 1962 was only slightly improved), there are
indications that this industry may be on its way to solving most of its
problems. Four domestic carriers, Delta, Northwest, National, and
Western, reported quite handsome profits for 1962, particularly for
the second half of the year.Circumstances were even improved for
the U.S. international air carriers in the second half of 1962.
Disparities in the fortunes of different firms also may help explain
why investments continue to be forthcoming in many transportation
activities. There is always a hope, sometimes even a well-based belief,
that if one is lucky, prudent, or an intelligent manager, one can make
a reasonable return on investments in regulated industries. Optimistic
hopes of beliefs are only strengthened, of course, if there is a tendencyA FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES 239
for regulation to gear itself to perpetuating in business the least
efficient members of an industry.
Finally, it must be recognized that elimination of fixed investments
in any industry requires time. In industries like railroading, involving
assets of very long economic life, this transition period may be quite
lengthy. Even in the airlines, recent experience suggests that the tran-
sition may be long and difficult enough to be both quite painful and
not readily obvious. A regulatory agency, or even private managements,
may not recognize capital consumption and the full adversity of a
industry situation until the processes of deterioration are well, perhaps
irreversibly, in progress. Needless to say, oversimplified, crude meas-
ures of rates of return do not increase the likelihood of early perception.
COMMENT
VERNON L. SMITH, Purdue University
Almost everyone must agree, by now, that the proper objective of
regulation is to simulate the competitive process, with the appropriate
incentives for service, efficiency, and technological improvement being
provided at the cost of no more than transitional, abnormal profits.
My difficulty with the Peck-Meyer paper (and perhaps its authors might
even agree) is that I really think regulatory simulation of the competitive
process is quite impossible. If profit is regulated in an attempt to keep
it within competitive norms, there are not only insurmountable measure-
ment problems, but the danger that the incentjves for efficiency and
technological progress will be lost.If incentive retention of profits
arising out of cost improvements is permitted, how much retention
should be permitted? A little more incentive for cost reduction can
always be provided by increasing the share of such profits that can be
retained. The competitive process requires neither measurement nor
the objective formal statement of criteria, but regulatory simulation
does, and that is why Peck and Meyer have set themselves a difficult task.
Despite these problems, I think their recommendations would im-
prove matters materially; they have gone about as far as one can go
with technical refinements, such as the use of present value calculations
and the careful analytical definition of capital, in specifying the appro-
priate rate base.I say "I think," because I really do not know. When
the authors come to grips with applying these principles, we find,
inevitably, statements like (p. 218), "... theconsumer price index and
the producers' durable equipment index might be given, as a first rough240 A FAIR RETURN FOR REGULATED INDUSTRIES
approximation, weights of one and two, respectively, in the construction
of a general composite index of price changes for the adjustment of
rate bases." We also find wise qualifications like (p. 215), "The use of
a simple index of the production cost of an ever-improving unit of
output isnot, however, an automatic cure-all.Depending on the
particular character of technological advance...thegains will be
shared differently by the different participants."
What I am trying to say is that the attempt to simulate the competitive
process requires somebody to make judgements about what is a fair
return, how capital should be measured, how this or that number should
be weighted, and so on.Such judgements, however rationally and
objectively made, tend to become institutionalized and inflexible.
But if regulatory simulation of the competitive process is impossible,
except in the roughest way, what then is the solutionto the problem
of regulation? I think the key to the answer is made plain in the Peck-
Meyer paper, as well as in the papers by James C. Nelson and Robert
A. Nelson. Peck and Meyer find that no matter how one proposes to
measure the rates of return in manufacturing industries, such rates are
considerably higher than those realized in the regulated transportation
industries, with the lone exception of pipelines. The gas and electric
utilities do about as well as manufacturing generally, with only the
telephone utilities doing better. These results provide little support for
the image of the American transportation system as a vast profit hungry
monopoly, that would quickly bleed the country to ruin were it not
for the protections provided by regulation.
With regard to transportation, the answer to the problem of regul-
ation is not, in my opinion, the development of more refined measures
of capital, rates of return, and so on. The answer is to be found in a
very substantial amount of deregulation.In time, preferably soon, I
would visualize the entire transportation industry subject only to
regulation under the anti-trust laws, and regulations pertaining to
safety.I would permit mergers between East-West and North-South
air carriers;I would favor railroad and truck mergers designed to
produce fully integrated, alternative-route, competitive transportation
systems, provided such mergers were not in violation of ordinary
anti-trust considerations.I would free most if not all classes of com-
modities, including passengers, from rate regulation.If there are not
now enough alternative, closely competing transport facilities to permit
reliance upon free competition in American transportation, then it is
abundantly clear that we should be regulating most of American
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But I would go further than transportation, and suggest that we
seriously consider deregulating the gas utilities and perhaps, in time,
the electric utilities.Close substitutes for natural gas in the form of
propane, heating oil, and electricity, are now sufficiently numerous,
as tosuggest that the regulation of the gas industry may be superfluous.
I can't imagine the gas companies getting away with rates much in
excess of the going equivalent prices of propane and heating oil.If
this conjecture should be wrong, I could only conclude that consumers
are indifferent at the higher price, and if they really are indifferent then
why waste all those administrative resources trying to regulate the
industry?
As for the electric utilities,itis evident •that close competitive
alternatives are not now commercially available. But there is a reason-
ably good possibility that self-contained home generating plants,
employing solar conversion devices, fuel cell, or gas turbine units will
in the future become economically competitive with centralized gener-
ating systems.Such a development could introduce competitive
pressures on the electric utilities that would eliminate, or drastically
alter, the necessity for regulation. We should be alert to the possibility
of such trends, and guard against the long institutional lag that
continues to characterize transport regulation.
Only the telephone utilities seem to be substantially insulated from
any impending prospect of competitive substitute service. So perhaps
in this industry, and for the time being in the electric utilities, we should
struggle along with the Peck-Meyer improvements and a frankly
imperfect attempt to simulate the competitive process.